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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK B. WOOD and 
SHIRL \Y. HALES, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs.-
NORTH SALT LAKE, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendant-Respon,dent. 
Case 
No. 9985 
Respondent's Brief On Appeal 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
As stated in the Brief of Appellants, this is an action 
by plaintiffs for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the City 
of North Salt Lake to issue a building permit which 
would enable them to build a residence in the Paul Sub-
division of North Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on stipulated facts before the 
Honorable Thornley K. Swan, District Judge of the Sec-
ond Judicial District and the \Y rit of 1\iandamus was 
denied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the decision of the trial 
court and the issuance of a Writ of _Mandamus. The re-
spondent asks that the judgment of the lower court he 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case were stipulated by the parties 
and the written stipulation of facts appears in the rec-
ord beginning at page 7. Appellants have rewritten 
these facts in their brief and have inserted various state-
ments that are not supported by the record. For this 
reason respondent will state the facts in the exact man-
ner in which they were stipulated. These facts are as 
follows: 
1. That on or about October 18, 1955, Louis J. Bow-
ers Sr. and Ella C. Bowers, his wife, being then the 
owners of a tract of land in the Town of North Salt 
Lake, Davis County, subdivided said land into lots and 
streets, said subdivision now being known as ''Paul Sub-
division." That Exhibit "A" [see Figure 1], attached 
hereto, is a plat of said original subdivision. 
2. That the Paul Subdivision "'as duly accepted by 
the Town Board of North Salt Lake on or about Octo-
ber 18, 1955, and the streets as shown in the plat were 
dedicated for the perpetual use of the public by the sub-
dividers; that after approval by the municipal authori-
ties the plat was duly recorded in the Recorder's Office 
of Davis County on the 18th day of October, 1955, as 
Entry No. 150887, in Book P or L & L, at Page 231. 
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3. That thereafter the subdivision was transferred to 
Modern Housing Corporation, a Utah corporation, and 
that certain subdivision improvements were made in said 
subdivision and certain homes were built on said sub-
division. 
4. That since the date of the approval of the sub-
division up to and including the present time, the area of 
the subdivision as shown by the shaded portion of Exhibit 
''A'' has remained undeveloped to the following extent: 
(a) No homes or other buildings have been con-
structed in this area. 
(b) No streets have been constructed in this 
area. 
(c) ~ o curb, gutter, sidewalk, paving or light-
ing has been installed in this area. 
5. That the area of the subdivision represented by 
the shaded portion of Exhibit ''A'' has been developed to 
the following extent: 
(a) That water mains were installed at the time 
the subdivision was approved and run in front of 
all lots. 
(b) That water connection fees were paid to the 
Town of North Salt Lake for 26 of said lots in Octo-
ber of 1955. 
(c) That in July of 1961 the South Davis Coun-
ty Sewer Improvement District installed sewer mains 
in this area and a connection tee was left to provide 
future service to the following lots : Lots 90-95, Lots 
74-79, and Lots 16-19. 
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6. That the remaining portion of the subdivision was 
fully developed and that all of the subdivision and street 
improvements were completed, however, said portion of 
the subdivision was amended to the extent as shown on 
the amended plat, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" [see figure 2] and made a part of this stipulation. 
7. That in January of 1963 plaintiffs, Jack B. Wood 
and Shirl W. Hales purchased from Modern Housing 
Corporation the following lots in Paul Subdivision: Lots 
15-19, Lots 74-79, and Lots 90-95. 
8. That on August 6, 1957, the Town Board of North 
Salt Lake duly enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance 
and zoning plan for the Town of North Salt Lake; that 
the area surrounding and including the Paul SubdiYision 
was zoned R-S for residential suburban use. 
9. That Section 15-5-1 of the North Salt Lake Zon-
ing Ordinance provides that the minimum lot area for 
any building lot in the R-S zone shall be 7,000 square 
feet. 
10. That none of the lots as platted in the shaded 
portion of Exhibit "A" contain 7,000 square feet; that 
in all other respects said lots conform to the building of 
zoning ordinances of North Salt Lake. 
11. That the comprehensive zoning ordinances of 
North Salt Lake which was enacted August 6, 1957, also 
contains the following provisions : 
1-11. NoNCONFORMING BuiLDING LoTs A~D UsEs. 
The lawful use of any building, structure, or land 
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t-xiHting at the time of the adoption of this ordi-
nall('P may be ('ontinued subject to all of the provi-
sions of Chapter 8 though such building or use 
does not conform to the regulations of the zone in 
which it is located, and any nonconforming build-
ing lot may be used for any lawful use set forth in 
the regulations for the zone in which it is located 
Hnhjert to the restrictions set forth in section ----· 
8-~. CoNTINUATION oF NoN CONFORMING UsEs AND 
~wxs. Subject to all limitations herein set forth, 
the operation of a nonconforming use and the 
maintenance of a nonconforming sign may be con-
tinued after the effective date of this ordinance. 
On or before January 1, 1958, or January 1st of 
any following year, following the effective date of 
this ordinance or of any amendment hereto by 
which the use of sign became non-conforming, the 
owner or owners of both the land on which a non-
conforming use is located, and the structure or 
structures in which a non-conforming use is locat-
ed, and the owner of land on which a nonconform-
ing use is located shall register such nonconform-
ing use or sign by filing with the Zoning Adminis-
trator a registration statement for such noncon-
forming use or sign, which shall include a notar-
ized affidavit setting forth the time that such use 
or sign came into existence, the size of the sign 
and the size and extent of the nonconforming use 
existing on the effective date of this ordinance. 
The Zoning Administrator shall preserve such 
statements and affiidavits and on the basis of such 
documents and upon the approval of the Planning 
Commission, certificates of occupancy shall be 
issued for each nonconforming use, one copy of 
which shall be sent to the owner of the noncon-
forming use or sign, one copy to the license asses-
sor, and one copy shall be retained in the file of 
the Zoning Administrator. Permits for noncon-
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forming signs shall be issued by the Zoning Ad-
ministrator as if application for permits for new 
signs were made. A careful record of such signs 
shall be maintained by the Zoning Administrator. 
8-6. TERMINATION OF NoNcONFORMING UsEs AND 
SIGNS. (1) BY ABANDONMENT. A nonconforming 
use of a building or a nonconforming use of land 
or a nonconforming sign which has been aban-
doned shall not thereafter be returned to such 
nonconforming use. A nonconforming use or sign 
shall be considered abandoned (a) when the char-
acteristic equipment and the furnishings of the 
non-conforming use have been removed and have 
not been replaced by similar equipment within one 
year, (b) when the nonconforming sign has been 
removed, (c) when the building or premises occu-
pied by a nonconforming use are left vacant for a 
period of one ( 1) year or more, (d) when the use 
or sign has been replaced by a conforming use, 
(e) when the use or sign has been replaced by a 
use which is not conforming to the provisions of 
the zone in which it is located. (While the chang-
ing of a nonconforming use or sign to a noncon-
forming or illegal use does terminate the right to 
continue such nonconforming use, the replacement 
use shall not be permitted to be operated.) (f) 
when the intent of the owner to discontinue the 
use is apparent as evidenced by his failure to reg-
ister a nonconforming use of land or structure 
which was not in operation on the effective date of 
this ordinance, or a nonconforming sign in the 
manner and within the time required by this 
chapter. 
12. That no registration statement or affidavit has 
ever been filed with the Zoning Administrator of North 
Salt Lake covering any non-conforming use in the Paul 
Subdivision. 
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13. rrlwt after aequiring certain lots in the Paul Sub-
divi~ion, plaintiffs made application to the Building De-
partment of North Salt Lake for a building permit to con-
~trurt a dwelling house on Lot 90, which is 60 feet x 100 
f•·d. 
14. That the applicants for the building permit ha,·e 
offered to guarantee the installation of the remaining 
subdh·ision improvements for said lot, but notwithstand-
ing said fact, the building inspector denied said applica-
tion and refused to issue a building permit on the ground 
that said lot fails to comply with the minimum area re-
quirements as set forth in the Comprehensive Zoning 
Ordinance of North Salt Lake. 
1:J. rrhat on the 11th day of February, 1963, plain-
tiffs filed a petition for review with the North Salt Lake 
Board of Adjustment, requesting a reversal of the de-
cision of the Building Inspector; that said petition was 
heard by the Board of Adjustment on Febn1ary 25, 1963, 
and on ~Iarch 9, 1963, plaintiffs were notified that said 
petition \\·as denied, but that the Board of Adjustment 
did not serve copies of its Findings of Fact upon the 
plaintiffs as required by Section 2-10-5 and Section 
:2-10-11 (2) of the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 
Xorth Salt Lake, notwithstanding the fact that demand 
was made for findings. 
Contrary to what is stated in appellant's brief, there 
Is nothing in the record or in the stipulation of facts 
showing that water connection fees have not been re-
funded to ~[odern Housing Corporation or the plaintiffs, 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or that any request has been made for any such refund; 
that sewer lines were not available in the area at the 
time of the passage of the zoning ordinance; that the area 
could not be replatted; that water mains have been grant-
ed to any water district or easements given; or that any 
connection tees exist in the water lines. 
It is also to be noted that this case does not involve 
an amendment to an existing zoning ordinance in an at-
tempt to discriminate against any particular subdivider, 
but rather it involves the passage of a complete compre-
hensive zoning ordinance, providing a zoning plan for the 
Town of North Salt Lake (R-9). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PLATTING AND RECORDING OF A 
SUBDIVISION DOES NOT EXEJ\1PT THE 
PROPERTY THEREIN FROM FUTURE ZON-
ING ORDINANCES; NOR DOES IT CREATE 
ANY VESTED PROPERTY OR CON-
TRACT RIGHT ON THE PART OF THE 
DEDICATOR. 
1. The Zoning Ordinance of North Salt Lake 
Is a V a.lid amd Reasonable Ordinance. 
It is clear in this case that the reason plaintiffs were 
denied the building permit which they sought was be-
cause the building lot in question fails to comply with 
the minimum area requirements as established by the 
North Salt Lake Zoning Ordinance. The cases and au-
thorities cited in plaintiffs' brief do not involve the va-
10 
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lidity of a. zoning ordinance and thus are not applicable 
to the ill~tant case. They simply hold that the acceptance 
mul n•(·ording of a subdivision plat operates as a dedi-
l'H tion of the platted streets for public use. The statutes 
provide a method for the vacating or changing of a sub-
division plat ( 37-5-6, 7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) and 
the t•ase of Boskovich v. Midvale City Corporation, 121 
rtah 443, 243 P. 2d 435, cited by plaintiffs, holds that a 
street can be vacated if the proper procedure is followed. 
It is difficult to see how any private easements could be 
established over the undeveloped portion of the Paul 
Subdivision in North Salt Lake, particularly in light of 
the fact that the proposed streets have never been con-
struded nor are there any homes or other structures in 
this area. Further, there is no evidence here of any claim 
to a pri,·ate right of way. Nor is there any evidence 
in thUi case of the request of the property owners or the 
refusal of the City of North Salt Lake to vacate the 
streets. It has been held that the owner or his successor 
can reclaim the use of dedicated property when the ob-
ject and purpose of making the dedication have com-
pletely failed, Am. Jur. Dedication, Section 64; also, that 
land will revert to the dedicator when the intended use 
becomes impossible, Am. Jur. Dedication, Section 65. 
Assuming, however, as plaintiffs have argued, that 
the filing and acceptance of the subdivision plat operates 
as an unconditional dedication of the platted streets, it 
does not follow that a platted subdivision cannot be in-
cluded in and made the subject of a valid zoning ordi-
nance. Respondent has been unable to find any authority 
11 
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for such an extreme position and certainly no such au-
thority has been cited by appellants in their brief. To 
say that zoning ordinances do not apply to property abut-
ting on a dedicated street is to practically nullify the 
entire purpose of zoning. 
A municipality clearly has the power to enact zon-
ing ordinances. This power is given in 10-9-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows: 
''RIGHT To REGULATE ZoNING. For the purpose of 
promoting health, safety, morals, and the general 
welfare of the community, the legislative body of 
cities and towns is empowered to regulate andre-
strict the height, number of stories and size of 
buildings and other structures, the percentage of 
lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts 
and other open spaces, the density of population 
and the location and use of buildings." 
The above specifically gives the city the power to im-
pose minimum area requirements. In construing the ex-
tent of the zoning power of a municipality, the Utah court 
has held in Hargraves v. Young, 3 Utah 2d 175, 280 P. 2d 
974, that sideyard requirements are valid and reasonably 
relate to public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 
It would be completely unreasonable to assume any dif-
ferent holding with respect to the imposition of minimum 
area requirements and such requirements haYe been gen-
erall~· held by the courts to be proper subjects for zon-
ing, Am. Jur. Zoning, Section 52. 
Some of the leading cases upholding the Yalidity and 
constitutionalit~· of area requirements in zoning ordi-
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mtm·es are C/(~utnlls v. ('if.IJ of Los An.geles, 36 Cal. 2d 95, 
jj2 P. 2<1 439, wherein the litigants were prohibited from 
conveying property in a bungalow court which had exist-
ed for a period of twenty years where conveyance of 
the separate parcels would reduce the individual owner-
ship of lots to a size below the Los Angeles minimum 
lot size as established by ordinance; and Simon. v. Town 
of .Vl'l'dham, 311 ~lass. 560, 42 N.E. 2d 516, "\Yherein the 
court observed that a municipality may regulate lot sizes 
to encourage such things as avoidance of congestion in 
stn'L'ts, prevention of overcrowding land, facilitation in 
furnishing transportation, light, sewer, and other public 
necessities, provision of sufficient recreational space for 
children to play, and the cultivation of flowers, shrubs 
nnd vegetables. 
Nor does the North Salt Lake zoning ordinance de-
prive plaintiffs of their property without just compen-
sation. Zoning laws are enacted in the exercise of the 
police power and differ from the right to restrict the use 
of real property by condemnation with compensation 
under the power of eminent domain. Thus such zoning 
laws are ordinarily held not to be invalid as a taking of 
property for public use without compensation. Am. Jur. 
Xouing Section 19. 
It has further been held that zoning ordinances are 
pn'sumed to be valid; the burden is upon the one assail-
ing the zoning ordinance to overcome the presumption; 
and every intendment is to be indulged by the court in 
favor of the validity of the measure. Am. Jur. Z onring, 
13 
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Section 16. All of these presumptions must be applied 
to this ease and there is nothing in the stipulation of 
facts herein which would in any way show the North 
Salt Lake Zoning Ordinance to be discriminatory or 
unreasonable. 
2. Substarntial improvements must be cou-
structed on the property before any restrd 
rights can accrue. 
It is conceivable that in rare cases the zoning orcli-
nanees of a municipality would not apply where there is 
an intervention of "vested rights." The concept of vest-
ed rights usually involves situations where a municipal-
ity issues a building permit and then attempts to revoke 
the same because of a change in the zoning ordinance. In 
such eases it has been held that a vested right can accrue 
when substantial expenditures have been made in good 
faith by the permittee toward accomplishing the purpose 
for which the permit was issued. ]f etzenbaum Law of 
Zoning, page 1167. 
It has also been held that no vested right can accrue 
where no building permit has been issued. Price r. 
Schwafel, 92 Cal. 77, 206 P. 2d 683; Jl etzenbaum Law of 
Zoning, page 1171. 
The following cases hold that the expenditures were 
not substantial enough to establish a Yested right: 
In lVl1eat Y. Barrett, 210 Cal. 193, 290 Pac. 1033, the 
permittee was held to have acquired no vested right 
n fter the passage of a new zoning ordinance even though 
he had contracted for the erection of the building and had 
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dug 610 feet of trench and erected 84 feet of concrete 
form~, the excavation costs amounting to $1,000.00. 
The cases further hold that a municipality does not 
<leprive one of vested rights by preventing construction 
of a building or use of property forbidden by the zoning 
Qrdinance or an amendment thereto, even though prior 
to enactment of the ordinance or amendment the protest-
ing party owned the land, Darlingtown v. Frankfort, 282 
Ky. 778, 110 S.W. 2d 392; incurred travel expenses and 
had tentative plans made, Rice v. V a;n, V ranken, 232 NYS, 
506; removed shrubbery, cut down trees and negotiated 
for a lease, Brady v. Keene, 90 N.H. 99, 4 A. 2d 658; 
leased land and spent a large sum on proposed oil drill-
ing operations, Marblehead Larnd Company v. Los Ange-
l('s, 36 F. 2d 242; purchased land with the intent to use it 
for a particular purpose, O'Rourke v. Teeters, 63 CA 2d 
:~..J.9, 146 P. 2d 983; purchased land, let building construc-
tion contracts, and started construction, Tucson v. Ari-
zona Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 272 Pac. 923; secured a p-
proval of a plot plan, made expenditures in obtaining per-
mits to cut curbs and install tanks, and applied for, but 
had not received a building permit, Sun Oil Cornpan.y v. 
Clifton, 13 N. J. 89, 80 A. 2d 258; applied for a building 
permit but before its issuance ordered structural steel, 
special windows and excavating, Atlas v. Dick, 86 NYS 
2d 231; obtained a building permit and entered into con-
tracts with third persons for construction of a building, 
Brett Y. Building Commissioner of Brookline, 250 ~Iass. 
i:i, 143 N.E. 269; obtained a building permit and then a 
zoning ordinance was adopted prohibiting the use and 
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thereafter construction work was done and liahilities in-
curred, Sun Oil Company v. Bradley Beach, 136 l\. J. 
307, 55 A. 2d 778; spent money but made no tang·ible 
change in the land itself by excavation or construction 
' Rice v. Van V rarnken, 232 NYS 506; and acquired title 
to land, obtained a building permit, made a contract for 
construction of the building, and a small amount of pre-
liminary work was done by the contractor, Bregman -r. 
Reville, 226 NYS 285. 
3. The facts of this case do not establish any 
vested rights. 
The most that can be said about plaintiffs in the in-
stant case is that they purchased the land in hopes of 
constructing on the nonconforming property. \Yhen 
plaintiffs purchased the lots in question in 1963 they 
were presumed to know of the existence of the North Salt 
Lake Zoning Ordinance. Their predecessors installed 
a water line and paid some water connection fees, but 
there is no evidence whatsoever that these improve-
ments were of a substantial nature. The installation of 
sewer lines and sewer connection tees cannot be consid-
ered because this was done long after the passage of the 
zoning ordinance and ·would therefore have been done at 
plaintiffs' risk. 
There is also nothing in the record whatsoever that 
indicates plaintiffs will suffer any pecuniary loss from 
the operation of the zoning ordinance. It is true that 
two lots will be lost if the area. is replatted, however, it is 
logical to assume that if the size of the lots is increased, 
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the market value of the lots will be increased. There is 
no evidence to the contrary. 
It ~hould also be noticed from Exhibits ''A'' and 
.. H" that the developed portion of the Paul Subdivision 
has been amended to conform with the North Salt Lake 
Zoning Ordinance. It would be undesirable to permit 
m•w construction on smaller lots which would back 
against the larger lots in the amended Paul Subdivision. 
It is rlear that plaintiffs have acquired no vested 
rights. The City of North Salt Lake has a legitimate 
intL•n·~t in the welfare of the community and desires to 
prt>Yent any new construction on substandard lots. 
POINT II. 
IN THE EVENT PLAINTIFFS' PREDECES-
SORS HAD ESTABLISHED ANY VESTED 
RIGHTS OR NONCONFORMING RIGHTS AT 
THE TIME OF THE PASSAGE OF THE 
NORTH SALT LAI(E ZONING ORDINANCE, 
SAID RIGHTS HAVE SINCE BEEN ABAN-
DONED. 
The undeveloped portion of the Paul Subdivision 
has remained dormant since its dedication in 1955. The· 
Xorth Salt Lake Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance was 
passed on August 6, 1957. The ordinance provided for 
the continuation of non-conforming uses and then pro-
vided in Section 8-6 that any such nonconforming use 
shall be deemed abondoned when the premises are left 
vacant for a period of one year or more. Appellants 
have argued that Section 8-6 is not applicable because 
... -
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of the inadvertence of the City Council in not asserting 
the section number in Section 1-11, the general section 
providing for the continuation of nonconforming uses. 
However, it is to be noted that Section 1-11 specifically 
provides that it is ''subject to all of the provisions of 
Chapter 8" and this would include Sections 8-2 and 8-6 .. 
The nonconforming use sections also specifically refer 
to the "nonconforming use of land." Ordinances must 
be construed in such a manner as to give them meaning 
and not in a manner as would make them meaningless 
or absurd. Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Company, 107 
Utah 114, 152 P. 2d 98. 
The only real question is whether such an abandon-
ment statute is constitutional and it is generally held that 
time limitations in an ordinance relating to non-conform-
ing uses of property are valid and proper. See llf.rfzen-
ba.um La1c of Zoning, page 1247. 
The Utah court, in conformity ·with other jurisdic-
tions, has recently upheld the validity of a one-year aban-
donment statute. Ill orrison v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 13lr 
363 p. 2d 1113. 
Another leading case is Franmor ReaUy Corporation 
v. LeBoeuf, 104 NYS 2d 247, wherein an ordinance set 
twelve months of discontinuance as a bar towards re-
sumption of a nonconforming use. The court held the 
ordinance to be reasonable and proper, even though there 
was no evidence of an intended abandonment. The lan-
guage of the court is as follows : 
"It seems clear that in this case there was no 
c\·idence whatsoever of any affirmative act on the 
13 
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part of the petitioner which might be construed 
or deemed to be a voluntary abandonment herein. 
All that appears in the record is that there was 
a non-usPr for several years. As heretofore 
pointed out, some of this period embraced the war 
years when restrictions on gasoline forced the 
closing of the station. 
However, the respondent [the municipality] 
relies on Section 900, subdivision 4 of the Zoning 
Ordinance above quoted. The respondent con-
strues this section to mean that the mere fact that 
the business was discontinued for more than one 
Yl'nr, results in an abandonment regardless of 
whether or not there was any intention to aban-
don the nonconforming use . 
. . . This leaves one remaining query: Is the 
ordinance, insofar as it attempts to abolish a non-
conforming use after non-use for one year, valid 
and constitutional1 
In this connection it must be borne in mind 
that the policy of the law is the gradual elimina-
tion of nonconforming uses, and, accordingly, or-
dinances should not be given an interpretation 
which would permit an indefinite continuation on 
the nonconforming use. McQuillan on Municipal 
Corporations, Third Edition, Volume 8, Section 8, 
Section 25.189 and cases cited ... 
The courts have gone far in holding that mere 
non-use for a specified period of time may termi-
nate the nonconforming use. See Standard Oil 
Company v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F. 2d 410. 
It seems well-established by the decisions that 
ordinances such as the one at bar are valid and 
constitutional. The only question that might arise 
in each case is the reasonableness of the period of 
time set forth in the ordinance. The court is satis-
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fied that the period of a year 1n the ordinance 
herein is a reasonable one.'' 
See also Beszedes v. Board of Commissioners of 
Arapahoe County, Colo. 178, P. 2d 950. 
In the case at bar no building permit was requested 
on the lot in question until1963. This is over seven years 
from the date of dedication of the subdivision. Thus any 
vested rights or established nonconforming use have now 
long been abandoned. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANTS CANNOT COl\IPLAIN OVER 
THEIR 0"\VN SELF-INFLICTED HARDSHIP. 
Appellants Jack B. Wood and Shirl W. Hales pur-
chased the property in question in January of 1963. This 
was more than five years after the passage of the North 
Salt Lake Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance. Thus, at 
the time of this purchase appellants had either actual or 
constructive notice of the existing zoning regulations. 
In a well-reasoned decision involving a similar fact 
situation, the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of 
Levy Y. Board of Adjustment of Arapahoe County, 369 
P. 2d 991, held that a self-inflicted hardship is a highly 
significant fact which is a material element bearing on 
the issue of the propriety of the refusal to grant a vari-
ance and weighs heaYily against a property owner 
seeking a variance. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the foregoing authorities, re-
spondPnt respectfully requests that the decision of the 
Xorth Salt Lake Board of Adjustment and the Davis 
County District Court be affirmed. 
THOMAS, ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS 
& WEST 
DAVID E. WEST 
Attorneys for Defen.da,nt-Respondent 
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